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EDWARD

1.

G.

MASCOLO·

INTRODUCTION

In the hierarchy of human values, none is more cherished than
the right of personal liberty, a right embodied within the more gen
eral right to be let alone. I This right "inheres in the very nature of
man,"2 and commands such respect in our constitutional scheme that
the state is prohibited from interfering with the individual's freedom
of action without a legitimate objective3 and a substantial purpose,4
and only then if the interference is pursuant to the requirements of
due process. s Moreover, such interference may not be arbitrary,6 or
• Research Attorney, Office of Judicial Education, Judicial Department, State of
Connecticut; member of the Connecticut and District of Columbia Bars; Editor-in-Chief
of the CONNECTICUT BAR JOURNAL, 1969-1973; current member of the CONNECTICUT
BAR JOURNAL Editorial Board; B.A., Wesleyan University, 1949; LL.B., Georgetown
University, 1952. The opinions expressed herein are those of the author alone.
I. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
2. Lewis v. City of Grand Rapids, 222 F. Supp. 349, 386 (W.D. Mich. 1963), rev'd
on other grounds, 356 F.2d 276 (6th Cir.), cerro denied, 385 U.S. 838 (1966).
3. See Bolling V. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954); Meyer V. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923).
4. See Police Dep't of Chicago V. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 101 n.8 (1972); Dixon V.
McMullen, 527 F. Supp. 711, 722-23 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
5. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 (1979); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215,
223 (1976). See also Mastin v. Fellerhoff, 526 F. Supp. 969, 972-73 (S.D. Ohio 1981);
Young V. Whitworth, 522 F. Supp. 759, 762 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
6. See Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,558 (1974) ("The touchstone of due pro
cess is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government. . . ."); West
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purposeless,? but rather it must be reasonable, and in furtherance of
a legitimate state interest. 8
This right of personal liberty encompasses the essential right to
physical liberty,9 and is a protected liberty interest under due pro
cess. IO Accordingly, before the government is permitted to infringe
upon an individual's interest in his liberty, it must act within the
bounds of procedures that are designed to insure that the state acts
fairly and pursuant to reasonable standards. I I
This article will analyze the right to physical liberty within the
context of a proceeding for civil contempt, and, in particular, the
need for appointed counsel for indigent parents threatened with in
carceration as a result of child-support contempt hearings. This ar
ticle first summarizes the contempt powers of courts, distinguishes
between civil and criminal contempts, and discusses the criteria for,
and defenses to, a finding of civil contempt. Second, it reviews the
meaning of, and need for, procedural due process, and examines the
factors entering into the due process equation. Third, it analyzes the
right to appointed counsel for indigent defendants in civil contempt
proceedings who are deprived of their physical liberty, argues that
. there is no meaningful distinction, for constitutional purposes, be
tween a criminal prosecution that leads to incarceration and a prose
cution for civil contempt that results in imprisonment, and concludes
that such a right exists and is of constitutional dimension. Finally, it
proposes a standard for the appointment of counsel in civil contempt
hearings.

II.
A.

THE CONTEMPT POWER

Historical Development and Modern Principles

The power of courts to punish contempts l2 is of ancient origin,
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 392 (1937); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
399-400 (1923); Dwen v. Barry, 483 F.2d 1126, 1130 (2d Cir. 1973).
7. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
8. See Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1284 (1st Cir. 1970).
9. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
10. See, e.g., Mastin v. Fellerhoff, 526 F. Supp. 969, 972 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Young
v. Whitworth, 522 F. Supp. 759,762 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
11. Major v. DeFrench, 286 S.E.2d 688, 695 (W. Va. 1982). See also Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 123, 161-62 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
12. A contempt of court is generally defined as "conduct calculated to embarrass,
hinder or obstruct a court in its administration of justice or to derogate from its authority
or dignity, or bring the administration of law into disrepute." In re Estate of Melody, 42
Ill. 2d 451, 452, 248 N.E.2d 104, 105 (1969). See State v. Jackson, 147 Conn. 167, 168-69,
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with roots stretching back to the early days of the English crown and
the common law. It began as a means of assuring the efficiency and
dignity of the sovereign, and evolved from the divine right of kings.
As society grew and diversified, it became necessary for the monar
chy to exercise its governmental powers through representatives.
Thus, the contempt power was employed by the courts of early Eng
land as a means of punishing a presumed contempt or disrespect of
the king's authority. In this way, the contempt power was assumed
by the courts as a means of vindicating the majesty and authority of
the crown, and of protecting their own existence. 13 Gradually, with
the rise in power of the courts in England, and their growing inde
pendence of the crown, the authority to punish for contempt was
considered inherent in the judiciary. 14 As such, it represented a step
in the judicial process providing a means for administering justice
and securing legal rights. 15
Lying at the foundation of our system of government is the right
of courts to conduct their business in an untrammeled manner. To
implement this right, courts of necessity must possess the power to
punish for contempt "when conduct tends directly to prevent the dis
charge of their functions."16 This power, however, may be abused,
and should not be exerted to squelch or punish courageous and
forthright conduct that does not have an impact upon the orderly
administration of justice. Conversely, it should be employed to
check improprieties and attempts to resist or defy the procedural and
substantive integrity of the judicial process. 17
The contempt power, or the power to punish, is inherent in all
courts. Its purpose is twofold: to vindicate the power and dignity of
a court, and to secure to party litigants the legal rights awarded by a
court. IS By preserving order in judicial proceedings and enforcing
the judgments, orders, and processes of the courts, its existence is
158 A.2d 166, 167 (1960); Beale, Contempt ofCourt, Criminal and Civil, 21 HARV. L. REV.
161, 162-64 (1908). See also R. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER 1 (1963).
13. See State v. Roll, 267 Md. 714, 726-27, 298 A.2d 867, 875 (1973); R. GOLD
FARB, supra note 12, at 9-14.
14. See State v. Roll, 267 Md. 714, 727, 298 A.2d 867, 875 (1973); R. GOLDFARB,
supra note 12, at 12-13.
15. R. GOLDFARB, supra note 12, at 13.
16. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 383 (1962). See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S.
252,266 (1941).
17. See Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. I, 8-9, 12 (1952).
18. Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 326, 327 (1904). See Ex parte
Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1874); II C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2960, at 581-82 (1973 & 1982 Supp.).
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essential to the due administration of justice. 19 Thus, a court will
properly exercise its contempt power to punish a party guilty of dis
respect to the court or its order, and to compel his performance of
some duty or act required of him by the court, and which he has
refused to discharge. 2o
B.

Types

of Contempt

Broadly stated, a contempt is any disobedience of the orders
and rules of a court that possesses the power to punish for such diso
bedience. 21 Although a contempt may be civil or criminal in na
ture,22 conduct, in fact, may amount to both civil and criminal
contempt,23 thereby justifying both coercive and punitive sanctions.
As a result, a particular act may have the characteristics of both.24
Since this is so, some courts have characterized contempt proceed
ings as "sui generis ,"25 in that they may take on the characteristics of
both civil and criminal proceedings. 26 It is more accurate, however,
to retain the civil-criminal classification for contempt cases, and to
interpret the sui generis designation as meaning only that there are
instances in which special rules must apply to contempt proceed
ingS. 27 For example, in contrast to other criminal proceedings, a
prosecution for summary criminal contempt need not be initiated by
an indictment or information,28 nor is further evidence or the aid of
a jury constitutionally required in such a proceeding. 29
19. Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1874). See Myers v. United
States, 264 U.S. 95, 103 (1924); In re Manufacturers Trading Corp., 194 F.2d 948, 956
(6th Cir. 1952).
20. In re Chiles, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 157, 168 (1875).
21. State v. Jackson, 147 Conn. 167, 168-69, 158 A.2d 166, 167 (1960). See 11 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 18, at 581.
22. Tobey v. Tobey, 165 Conn. 742, 745, 345 A.2d 21, 24 (1974); Spaiter v. Wayne
Circuit Judge, 35 Mich. App. 156, 160, 192 N.W.2d 347, 349 (1971).
23. Gombers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911); Bessette v.
W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 329 (1904); 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 18,
at 583.
24. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 298-99 (1947).
25. Myers v. United States, 264 U.S. 95, 103 (1924); Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co.,
194 U.S. 324, 326 (1904); In re Manufacturers Trading Corp., 194 F.2d 948, 956 (6th Cir.
1952). See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 440 (1932).
26. People ex rel Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Barasch, 21 Ill. 2d 407, 409, 173 N.E.2d
417,418 (1961).
27. See Dobbs, Contempt o/Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 183,235 (1971).
28. People v. Thor, 6 Ill. App. 3d 1045, 1049, 286 N.E.2d 769, 772 (Dist..Ct. 1972);
Newby v. District Court, 259 Iowa 1330, 1342, 147 N.W.2d 886, 894 (1967); Dobbs, supra
note 27, at 221, 235. See Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 307-09, 313-14 (1888).
29. Fisher v. Pace, 336 U.S. 155, 159-60 (1949); Horn v. District Court, 647 P.2d
1368, 1375 (Wyo. 1982). See Beale, supra note 12, at 172.
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Although the line of demarcation between civil and criminal
contempt is not always distinct, or even perceptible,3D and sanctions
for both types of contempt may be by way of either imprisonment or
fine,3l certain distinctions have emerged from an analysis of the au
thorities and may be summarized.
A civil contempt arises from a private wrong in which one party
litigant causes harm to another litigant by failing to comply with a
court order. Its purpose is to compensate the injured party, or to
coerce the recalcitrant party into compliance by invoking the court's
power to impose fines or incarceration. Thus, the defendant is given
the choice of either performing the required act or paying the pen
alty.32 He carries, in effect, "the keys of [his] prison in [his] own
pockets."33 Accordingly, a contempt will be classified as civil when
the punishment is wholly remedial, serves only the purposes of the
complaining party, and is not imposed as a deterrent to offenses
against the public. 34
In contrast, a criminal contempt arises from an individual's in
terference with the court's authority or dignity and is perceived to be
a public wrong. Here, the imposition of a penalty in the form of a
fine or imprisonment is punitive, rather than remedial in nature, and
serves to vindicate the authority of the court. 35 Accordingly, compli
30. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911); Board of
Educ. v. Shelton Educ. Ass'n, 173 Conn. 81, 85, 376 A.2d 1080, \082 (1977); Board of
Junior College v. Cook County College Teachers Union, 126 Ill. App. 2d 418, 427, 262
N.E.2d 125, 129 (Dist. Ct. 1970), cerl. denied, 402 U.S. 998 (1971); State v. Roll, 267 Md.
714, 728, 298 A.2d 867, 876 (1973); State v. Kilbane, 61 Ohio St. 2d 201, 204-05, 400
N.E.2d 386, 390 (1980); 11 c. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 18, at 583.
31. See McTigue v. New London Educ. Ass'n, 164 Conn. 348, 352-55, 321 A.2d
462,464-65 (1973); Board of Junior College v. Cook County College Teachers Union,
126 Ill. App. 2d 418, 427-28, 262 N.E.2d 125, 129 (Dist. Ct. 1970), cerl. denied, 402 U.S.
998 (1971).
32. See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 303-04 (1947); Wolfe
v. Coleman, 681 F.2d 1302, 1306 (11th Cir. 1982); In re Irving, 600 F.2d 1027, \031 (2d
Cir.), cerl. denied sub nom. DiLapi v. Irving, 444 U.S. 866 (1979); Duval v. Duval, 114
N.H. 422, 425, 322 A.2d 1,3 (1974); State v. Kilbane, 61 Ohio St. 2d 201,204-05,206-07,
400 N.E.2d 386, 390, 391 (1980); Ex parle Wilson, 559 S.W.2d 698, 699 (Tex. Civ. App.
1977).
33. In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461 (8th Cir. 1902).
34. McCrone v. United States, 307 U.S. 61, 64 (1939); See Nye v. United States,
313 U.S. 33, 42 (1941); Hom v. District Court, 647 P.2d 1368, 1372-73 (Wyo. 1982). See
also In re Irving, 600 F.2d \027, \031 (2d Cir.), eerl. denied sub nom. DiLapi v. Irving,
444 U.S. 866 (1979).
35. Wolfe v. Coleman, 681 F.2d 1302, 1306 (11th Cir. 1982); Duval v. Duval, 114
N.H. 422, 425, 322 A.2d 1,3 (1974); State v. Kilbane, 61 Ohio St. 2d 201, 204-05, 207, 400
N.E.2d 386, 390 (1980); Ex parle Wilson, 559 S.W.2d 698, 699 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 302-03 (1947); In re Irving, 600
F.2d \027, \031 (2d Cir.), em. denied sub nom. DiLapi v. Irving, 444 U.S. 866 (1979);
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ance with the court's mandate will not lift or remove the sanction
imposed. 36
In sum, a civil contempt is primarily coercive in nature and is
intended to compel compliance with the lawful orders of a court.
Conversely, a criminal contempt is punitive in character and is em
ployed to vindicate the authority and dignity of the law and the
court. Thus, the primary purpose of civil contempt is to coerce,
while the principal function of criminal contempt is to punish. 37
Consequently, the proper test for distinguishing a sanction for civil
contempt from that for criminal contempt is to ascertain the primary
objective of the court in imposing sentence. 38 In this equation, a
court's characterization of a contempt proceeding as being either
civil or criminal, while relevant, will not be conclusive and will be
but one factor to be considered in determining the nature of such a
proceeding. 39 Ultimately, a correct determination will tum on the
Hom v. District Court, 647 P.2d 1368, 1377 (Wyo. 1982). See C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL 2d § 702, at 809 (1982).
36. In re Irving, 600 F.2d 1027, 1031 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. DiLapi v.
Irving, 444 U.S. 866 (1979); II c. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 18, at § 2960, at 585.
See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418,442-43 (1911).
37. United States v. Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org., 678 F.2d I, 4 (1st
Cir. 1982); In re Dinnan, 625 F.2d 1146, 1149 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); In re Stewart,
571 F.2d 958, 963 (5th Cir. 1978); Gorham v. City of New Haven, 82 Conn. 153, 155, 72
A. 1OI2, 1014 (1909); In re S.L.T., 180 So. 2d 374, 378-79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965);
People ex rel Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Barasch, 21 Ill. 2d 407, 409, 173 N.E.2d 417, 418
(1961); Small v. Small, 413 A.2d 1318, 1322 (Me. 1980); State v. Kilbane, 61 Ohio St. 2d
201,204-05,400 N.E.2d 386, 390 (1980); Ventures Management Co. v. Geruso, 434 A.2d
252, 254 (R.I. 1981); Hom v. District Court, 647 P.2d 1368, 1373 (Wyo. 1982); II C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 18, at 584; Dobbs, supra note 27, at 235; Comment,
The Coercive Function of Civil Contempt, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 120, 123-24 (1965). See
United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 302-04 (1947); Gompers v. Bucks
Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441-43 (1911); Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S.
324, 328-29 (1904); In re Irving, 600 F.2d 1027, 1031 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
DiLapi v. Irving, 444 U.S. 866 (1979); Spalter v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 35 Mich. App.
156, 160-61, 192 N.W.2d 347, 349 (1971). For excellent summaries of the distinctions
between civil and criminal contempt, see De Parcq v. United States District Court, 235
F.2d 692, 699 (8th Cir. 1956); II C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 18, at 583-84.
38. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966) ("what does the court pri
marily seek to accomplish by imposing sentence?"); Lamb v. Cramer, 285 U.S. 217, 220
21 (1932); Labor Relations Comm'n v. Fall River Educators' Ass'n, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh.
297,308,416 N.E.2d 1340,1347 (1981); Curlee v. Howle, 287 S.E.2d 915, 919 (S.c. 1982).
See Dobbs, supra note 27, at 235. But see State v. Roll, 267 Md. 714, 729-30, 298 A.2d
867,876-77 (1973) (endorsing approach which emphasizes personal, adjunctive, and less
significant nature of proceedings for civil contempt, and official, independent, and more
serious nature of proceedings for criminal contempt).
39. See Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 42-43 (1941); Wolfe v. Coleman, 681
F.2d 1302, 1306 n.8 (11th Cir. I 982);fn re Rumaker, 646 F.2d 870, 871 (5th Cir. 1980);fn
re Dinnan, 625 F.2d 1146, 1149 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
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purpose and character of the sanction imposed. 40 It becomes appar
ent, therefore, that the classification of a contempt is not of the act of
contempt, but rather of the contempt proceeding or the sanction im
posed. 41 Accordingly, a court may respond to a contumacious act by
imposing both criminal and civil sanctions, one to vindicate its au
thority, the other to compel compliance with its orders or decrees. 42
Of final relevance to the distinguishing characteristics of the two
types of proceedings is their procedural role in the legal process. In
the case of a civil contempt, it operates as a facet of a principal suit,
while a criminal contempt is a separate action or proceeding brought
in the name of the state or government. 43 For example, in the typical
civil contempt situation, a party litigant is ordered to perform, or to
refrain from doing, an act relevant to the principal suit, and if he
refuses to do so at the time when performance is required or due, his
refusal will constitute a contumacious act justifying imposition of co
ercive sanctions. 44 Such refusal is in the nature of a constructive, or
indirect, contempt because it takes place outside of the immediate
presence and view of the court. 45 Although criminal contempts may
be constructive, they can also arise as direct contempts committed
witlitn the immediate presence and view of the court. Such direct
affronts to the dignity and authority of the judicial branch of govern
ment may be dealt with summarily without doing violence to due
process. 46 This power is inherent in a court and is essential to the
due administration of justice. Without it, a court would be power
40. In re Rumaker, 646 F.2d 870, 871 (5th Cir. 1980). See In re Dinnan, 625 F.2d
1146, 1149 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (purpose of contempt judgment is the "conclu
sive, most important" factor in distinguishing civil from criminal contempt). Although
this analysis will lead to the correct result, the logic of this approach is somewhat dubi
ous. To argue that the purpose of a sanction defines a contempt is to place the cart before
the horse. In reality, the contempt will define the sanction, because a court will be re
sponding to a particular contumacious act by tailoring a sanction to fil the act.
41. Dobbs, supra note 27, at 236-37.
42. In re Irving, 600 F.2d 1027, 1031 (2d Cir.), cerl. denied sub nom. DiLapi v.
Irving, 444 U.S. 866 (1979); Dobbs, supra note 27, at 236-37.
43. See In re Stewart, 571 F.2d 958, 963 (5th Cir. 1978).
44. See Board of Educ. v. Brunswick Educ. Ass'n, 61 Ohio St. 2d 290,294-95,401
N.E.2d 440, 443-44 (1980). See also L.A.M. v. State, 547 P.2d 827, 831 (Alaska 1976);
State ex reL L.E.A. v. Hammergren, 294 N.W.2d 705, 708 (Minn. 1980).
45. See McNabb v. Osmundson, 315 N.W.2d 9, 11 (Iowa 1982); Horn v. District
Court, 647 P.2d 1368, 1373 (Wyo. 1982). Cf. Wolfe v. Coleman, 681 F.2d 1302, 1306
(11th Cir. 1982) (applying same definition to indirect criminal contempts).
46. Fisher v. Pace, 336 U.S. 155, 159-60 (1949) (no further evidence, or the aid of a
jury, is required); Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 534 (1925) (dictum) (since the
court has witnessed the offense, there is no need for either evidence or the assistance of
counsel); Wolfe v. Coleman, 681 F.2d 1302, 1306 (11th Cir. 1982). See Ex parle Terry,
128 U.S. 289, 307-309, 313-14 (1888); Beale, supra note 12, at 172. Where the contempt is
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less to prevent persons disposed to thwarting, delaying, or ob
structing it or its processes47 and would not be able to perform its
official functions properly.48
C. Proceduresfor Civil Contempt
Courts possess the inherent power to enforce compliance with
their lawful orders by means of sanctions imposed through civil con
tempt. 49 In the typical civil contempt case, an individual is ordered
by a court to perform an act, and if he refuses to do so at the time
when performance is required or due, his refusal will constitute a
contumacious act justifying the imposition of sanctions until he
purges himself of the contempt. 50 Until the time for performance
has arrived, however, there can be no contempt. 51
A civil contempt for failure to comply with a court order usually
consists of the following elements: (1) the existence of a valid order
directing the contemner, over whom the court has jurisdiction, to do
or to refrain from doing a certain act; (2) notice to the contemner of
the order within reasonably sufficient time for compliance; (3) the
ability of the contemner to comply with the order; and (4) noncom
pliance with the order by the contemner. 52 Since an adjudication or
finding of civil contempt is intended to "coerce future conduct," and
not to punish past misconduct, good faith is not a defense. 53 Willful
ness, therefore, is not a prerequisite to an adjudication of civil con
tempt. 54 There must exist, however, an ability to comply with the
constructive or indirect, however, the defendant is entitled to reasonable notice of the
accusation and a separate contempt hearing. Wolfe v. Coleman, 681 F.2d at 1306.
47. Fisher v. Pace, 336 U.S. 155, 159 (1949); State v. Jackson, 147 Conn. 167, 169,
158 A.2d 166, 167-68 (1960); Goodhart v. State, 84 Conn. 60, 63, 78 A. 853, 853-54
(l911). See United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 315-16 (1975); Ex parte Terry, 128
U.S. 289, 313 (1888); STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, SPECIAL FUNCTIONS OF THE TRIAL JUDGE Standard 6-4.1 (Approved Draft
1978); Kuhns, The Summary Contempt Power: A Critique and a New Perspective, 88
YALE L.J. 39,39-40 (1978).
48. See Myers v. United States, 264 U.S. 95, \03 (1924).
49. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966).
50. Board of Educ. v. Brunswick Educ. Ass'n, 61 Ohio St. 2d 290, 294-95, 401
N.E.2d 440, 443-44 (1980).
51. Id at 295, 40 1 N.E.2d at 444.
52. L.A.M. v. State, 547 P.2d 827, 831 (Alaska 1976). See State ex rel L.E.A. v.
Hammergren, 294 N.W.2d 705, 708 (Minn. 1980).
53. McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 191 (1949) (intent of recalci
trant party is irrelevant to a finding of civil contempt); Fortin v. Commissioner of Mass.
Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 692 F.2d 790, 796 (1st Cir. 1982).
54. United States v. AbodeeJy, 564 F. Supp. 327, 329 (N.D. Iowa 1983); Miller v.
Carson, 550 F. Supp. 543, 545 (M.D. Fla. 1982); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 448 F. Supp.

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

1983)

609

court's order,55 the absence of which will constitute a defense. 56
The procedures for civil contempt are substantially as follows:
(a) a motion for contempt;
(b) an order of notice to the alleged contemner to appear and to
show cause why he should not be adjudged in contempt of
court;
(c) a hearing on the motion; and
(d) a finding and appropriate order for contempt. 57

1.

Ability to Comply with Court Order

As noted earlier,58 a civil contempt arises from an individual's
refusal to obey a lawful order of a court, and may be punished by
conditional confinement for the purpose of coercing compliance. 59
The rationale for incarceration in this instance is that the contemner
carries the keys of his prison with him and his confinement will last
only until he has complied with the court's order.60 It is thus appar
ent that a court may not coerce that which is beyond a person's
power to perform, and that, accordingly, incarceration for civil con
tempt is dependent upon the ability of a contemner to comply with
the court's order,61 an ability that must exist "as a matter of sub
stance as well as form."62 Consequently, an inability to comply is an
659, 670 (D.R.I. 1978); Aspira of New York, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 423 F. Supp. 647,
653-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). See McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 191
(1949); AMF Inc. v. Jewett, 711 F.2d 1096, 1104 (1st Cir. 1983) (finding of civil contempt
does not require element of scienter); NLRB v. Blevins Popcorn Co., 659 F.2d 1173,
1183-84 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
55. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 371 (1966).
56. Fortin v. Commissioner of Mass. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 692 F.2d 790, 796 (1st
Cir. 1982).
57. See, e.g., Gorham v. City of New Haven, 82 Conn. 153, 156,72 A. 1012, 1014
(1909); Planning & Zoning Comm'n v. Zeme! Bros., Inc., 29 Conn. Supp. 450, 453, 292
A.2d 267, 270 (Super. Ct. 1971); Nemeth v. Nemeth, 451 A.2d 1384, 1387 (Pa. Super.
1982). See also 2 W. NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT §§ 16.11-16.22 (rev. 2d ed.
1961). See generally Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911);
Beale, supra note 12, at 172-73.
58. See supra text accompanying notes 32-34 & 52.
59. See Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 368 (1966).
60. In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461 (8th Cir. 1902) (imprisoned contemnors "may
[comply with the orders of the court) at any time").
61. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 371 (\966); In re Grand Jury Investi
gation, 600 F.2d 420, 423 (3d Cir. 1979). See Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 76 (1948);
United States v. Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org., 524 F. Supp. 160, 164 (D.D.C.
1981); State ex reI. Department of Human Servs. v. Rae!, 97 N.M. 640. 643. 642 P.2d
1099, 1102 (1982); State v. Kilbane, 61 Ohio S1. 2d 201, 205-06, 400 N.E.2d 386, 390
(1980); Barrett v. Barrett, 470 Pa. 253, 264, 368 A.2d 616, 621 (1977).
62. Murray v. Murray, 60 Hawaii 160, 162,587 P.2d 1220, 1222 (1978).
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affirmative63 and complete defense to coercive imprisonment
proceedings. 64
Ability to comply does not mean the ability to fully and com
pletely comply. Hence, to sustain the defense of inability, an alleged
contemner need only to establish that he has been "reasonably dili
gent and energetic" in attempting to comply with the court's order6 5
by taking all reasonable steps within his power to ensure compli
ance,66 or that he has a reasonable or lawful excuse for not comply
ing. 67 Ultimately, the existence of an inability to comply with the
court's order is a question of fact, to be determined from all of the
evidence. 68
2.

Burden of Proof

Although the burden of proving noncompliance with a valid
court order will rest with the party prosecuting the contempt action
by "clear and convincing" evidence,69 the burden of persuasion cono
cerning the defendant's ability to comply will lie with the defend
63. Department of Revenue v. Oliver, 636 P.2d 1156, 1159 (Alaska 1981).
64. See United States v. Rylander, \03 S. Ct. 1548, 1552 (1983); Maggio v. Zeitz,
333 U.S. 56,76 (1948); Fortin v. Commissioner of Mass. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 692 F.2d
790, 796 (1st Cir. 1982).
65. Aspira of New York, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 423 F. Supp. 647, 654 (S.D.N.Y.
1976). Accord, Ricci v. Okin, 537 F. Supp. 817, 824 (D. Mass. 1982); Swift v. Blum, 502
F. Supp. 1140, 1143 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); United States v. Swingline, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 37,
44-45 (E.D.N.Y. 1974). This test requires that the defendant take all reasonable steps
within his power to ensure compliance with the order. Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald, 544
F.2d 396, 406 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977); Ricci v. Okin, 537 F.
Supp. at 824.
66. Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald, 544 F.2d 396, 406 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 931 (1977); Ricci v. Okin, 537 F. Supp. 817, 824 (D. Mass. 1982).
67. Johansen v. State, 491 P.2d 759, 767 (Alaska 1971).
68. Roper v. Roper, 242 Ky. 658, 660, 47 S.W.2d 517, 519 (Ct. App. 1932).
69. AMF Inc. v. Jewett, 711 F.2d \096, 1100 (1st Cir. 1983); NLRB v. Blevins
Popcorn Co., 659 F.2d 1173, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v. Rylander, 656 F.2d
1313, 1318 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, \03 S. Ct. 1548 (1983); United States v.
Rizzo, 539 F.2d 458, 465 (5th Cir. 1976); Stringfellow v. Haines, 309 F.2d 9\0, 912 (2d
Cir. 1962); Miller v. Carson, 550 F. Supp. 543, 545 (M.D. Fla. 1982) (preponderance
standard of proof is not sufficient). See Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 448 F. Supp. 659, 670-71
(D.R.I. 1978). Although some courts have endorsed the preponderance standard of
proof, e.g., Johansen v. State, 491 P.2d 759, 766 (Alaska 1971); In re Hughes, 318 So. 2d
409,4\0 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); see Barrett v. Barrett, 470 Pa. 253, 263-64, 368 A.2d
616,621 (1977), the clear and convincing standard should be applied, since an order of
civil contempt may also lead to incarceration, see Stringfellow, 309 F.2d at 912, and
would be consistent with the standard employed in civil involuntary mental commitment
proceedings. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979). In criminal contempt pro
ceedings, the standard of proof is knowing, intentional, and willful noncompliance or
violation beyond a reasonable doubt. NLRB v. Blevins Popcorn Co., 659 F.2d 1173,
1183-84 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (dictum).
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ant. 70 This is so because failure to comply with a court or judicial
decree is prima facie evidence of contempt. 71 The defendant, there
fore, must refute this evidence and demonstrate, by a preponderance
of the evidence, his inability to comply,72 and that his incapacity was
not the result of deliberate and calculated choice. 73 Conversely, a
defense of inability to comply will not be recognized, if the defend
ant has willfully or voluntarily incapacitated himself from comply
ing, or has refused reasonably to exert himself. 74
This allocation of the respective burdens is not without danger
to the defendant, especially when one considers the potentially grave
consequences stemming from a finding of contempt. The problem is,
of course, that it may prove to be difficult to determine whether the
defendant is in fact able to comply. Thus, it may be that he is truly
unable to obey the order, but that the court does not believe him,
70. Fortin v. Commissioner of Mass. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 692 F.2d 790, 796 (1st
Cir. 1982); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 448 F. Supp. 659, 671 (D.R.I. 1978); Johansen v.
State, 491 P.2d 759, 766 (Alaska 1971); Orr v. Orr, 141 Fla. 112, 117,192 So. 466, 468
(1939) (per curiam); In re S.L.T., 180 So. 2d 374, 379 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (since the
making of a court order involves an implicit finding of ability to comply, a defendant in a
civil contempt proceeding "has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evi
dence such inability"); Roper v. Roper, 242 Ky. 658, 660, 47 S.W.2d 517, 519 (Ct. App.
1932); Nauman v. Nauman, 320 N.W.2d 519, 521 (S.D. 1982) (per curiam); Bailey v.
Bailey, 77 S.D. 546, 549, 95 N.W.2d 533, 534 (1959); De Yonge v. De Yonge, 103 Utah
410,412, 135 P.2d 905, 906 (1943); 2 W. NELSON, supra note 57, at § 16.25a, at 440-41.
See United States v. Rylander, 103 S. Ct. 1548, 1552, 1554 (1983); United States v.
Fleischman, 339 U.S. 349, 362-63 (1950); State, Dep't of Revenue v. Oliver, 636 P.2d
1156, 1159 (Alaska 1981).
71. United States v. Rylander, 656 F.2d 1313, 1318 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd on other
grounds, 103 S. Ct. 1548 (1983); Roper v. Roper, 242 Ky. 658, 660, 47 S.W.2d 517, 519
(Ct. App. 1932). This evidence will be sufficient to prove contempt, in the absence of
evidence of inability to comply, which must be produced by the defendant. See Ry
lander, 656 F.2d at 1318, 1319.
72. Johansen v. State, 491 P.2d 759, 767 (Alaska 1971); In re S.L.T., 180 So. 2d
374, 379 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App., 1965).
73. Bailey v. Bailey, 77 S.D. 546, 549, 95 N.W.2d 533, 534 (1959); 2 W. NELSON,
supra note 57, at § 16.25a, at 440. See Orr v. Orr, 141 Fla. 112, 117,192 So. 466, 468
(1939) (per curiam); Nauman v. Nauman, 320 N.W.2d 519,520 (S.D. 1982) (per curiam);
Jameson v. Jameson, 306 N.W.2d 240, 241 (S.D. 1981).
74. 2 W. NELSON, supra note 57, at § 16.25, at 433. See Orr v. Orr, 141 Fla. 112,
117, 192 So. 466, 468 (1939) (per curiam); Hopp v. Hopp, 279 Minn. 170, 176, 156
N.W.2d 212, 217 (1968) (there is no defense if the party directed to comply "has not
made a reasonable effort by means of his own selection to conform to an order well
within his inherent, but unexercised, capacities"); Nauman v. Nauman, 320 N.W.2d 519,
520-21 (S.D. 1982) (per curiam). But see Falstaff Brewing Corp. v. Miller Brewing Co.,
702 F.2d 770, 782 n.7 (9th Cir. 1983) ("inability-whether or not se1f-induced-is a com
plete defense to a charge of coercive civil contempt"). Since a court may not civilly
coerce that which cannot be performed, the Falsto/f approach would appear to be correct.
However, "self-induced ability" should not go unpunished and may be proceeded
a&ainst as a constructive criminal contempt. See id at 782 n.7.
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thereby resulting in an indefinite confinement. 7S
III.
A.

THE DUE PROCESS EQUATION

Concept and Meaning

Justice Frankfurter has described due process as a legal concept
in these terms: "Due process is perhaps the most majestic concept in
our whole constitutional system. While it contains the garnered wis
dom of the past in assuring fundamental justice, it is also a living
principle not confined to past instances."76 Not surprisingly, then,
the interpretation and application of due process have become pro
foundly practical matters that, because of the inherent flexibility of a
process of adaptation and adjustment, negate any concept of fixed
procedures rigidly applicable to all situations. 77
From this it is seen that procedural due process is not cast in a
rigid mold 78 and has evolved through the centuries to embody "those
... usages and modes of proceeding" existing in Anglo-American
law79 that have come to stand for an abiding sense of fundamental
fairness in the relations between government and citizen.80 Thus,
due process of law, again in the words of Justice Frankfurter,
is a summarized constitutional guarantee of respect for those per
sonal immunities which, as Mr. Justice Cardozo twice wrote for
the Court, are [principles of justice) "so rooted in the traditions
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental,"
75. Dobbs, supra note 27, at 272. See generally Comment, supra note 37, at 122
(since incarceration may continue until compliance, a civil contemnor's sentence "theo
retically can continue indefinitely").
76. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 174 (1951)
(F rankfurter, J., concurring).
77. See Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24-25 (1981); Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565,577-78 (1975); Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union Local 473 v.
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 123, 174 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); White v. Division of Family Services,
634 S.W.2d 258, 260 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (due process is "an adaptable doctrine," and
"must be determined by what is just in light of the details of the particular case"). See
also Landon v. Plasencia, \03 S. Ct. 321, 330 (1982).
78. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18,24 (1981); Rochin v. Cali
fornia, 342 U.S. 165, 170-72 (1952). See Schaefer, Federalism and Slale Criminal Proce
dure, 70 HARv. L. REV. 1,6 (1956).
79. Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.)
272, 277 (1856).
80. See Landon v. Plasencia, \03 S. Ct. 321, 330 (1982); Lassiter v. Department of
Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18,24 (1981); Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 487 n.15 (1978);
Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 563-64 (1967); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236
(1941).
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. or are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."81

The meaning of "fundamental fairness," while embracing a no
ble ideal, "can be as opaque as its importance is lofty."82 Applying
due process "is therefore an uncertain enterprise which must dis
cover what 'fundamental fairness' consists of in a particular situa
tion" by considering relevant precedents and assessing the several
(and competing) interests that are at stake. 83

B. Applicability
It is a fundamental precept that due process protects the indi

vidual from arbitrary state action. 84 Accordingly, under the four
teenth amendment to the federal Constitution, a state may not
deprive an individual of life, liberty, or property without due process
oflaw. 85 In order to determine whether state action has violated this
prohibition, a court must make two inquiries: first, a protected inter
est under due process must be identified; and, second, the degree of
process due to the individual before he may be deprived of that in
terest must be ascertained. 86 Thus, once it is determined what pro
cess is due to the individual before he may be divested of a protected
interest by state action, the procedures employed by the state will be
scrutinized to see if they comport with the requirements of federal
procedural due process. 87 This, in turn, requires an inquiry into the
nature of the interest at stake. 88 Ultimately, however, the govern
ment will be required to act within the bounds of procedures that are
designed to ensure that the state acts fairly and pursuant to reason
able standards. 89 These procedures require, as "the essentials of due
81. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952) (quoting Snyder v. Massachu
setts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934), and Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937».
82. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18,24 (1981).
83. Id at 24-25.
84. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975).
85. U.S. CON ST. amend. XIV, § I.
86. Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091, 1097 (7th Cir. 1982); Ryan v. Cleland, 531 F.
Supp. 724, 730 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); Young v. Whitworth, 522 F. Supp. 759, 762 (S.D. Ohio
1981). See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-24 (1976); Board of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972); Mastin v. Fellerhoff, 526 F. Supp. 969, 972 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
87. Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091, 1098 (7th Cir. 1982); Ryan v. Cleland, 531 F.
Supp. 724, 730 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-24 (1976);
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972).
88. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 575-76 (1975); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564,570-71 (1972). See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
89. Major v. DeFrench, 286 S.E.2d 688, 695 (W. Va. 1982). See Mathews v. El
dridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 123, 161-62 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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process," that before the state may deprive the individual of life, lib
erty, or property, it must accord him (1) an appropriate tribunal;
(2) an inquiry into the merits of the question presented; (3) reason
able notice of the purpose of the inquiry; (4) a fair opportunity to
appear in person or by counsel; (5) a meaningful opportunity to be
heard; and (6) a judgment rendered in the record thus made. 90 It
becomes apparent, therefore, that the procedural guarantees of due
process apply whenever a state seeks to extinguish, or to significantly
alter, interests encompassed by the fourteenth amendment's protec
tion of liberty and property. Moreover, when protected interests are
implicated, the individual affected thereby will be entitled to a prior
hearing. 91
In summary, whether procedural due process will be required
before the government will be permitted to take action against an
individual will depend on the extent of loss ultimately incurred by
the individual. The inquiry must be addressed not merely to the
"weight" of the particular interest at stake, but also, and in particu
lar, to whether the nature of the interest is one entitled to liberty or
property protection under due process. If it is determined that due
process is applicable, the question remaining is, what process is due?
Here, a court will be confronted with the flexible scope of due pro
cess and must recognize that the procedural protections required will
be determined by the demands of the particular situation. This, in
tum, will require a determination of the precise nature of the com
peting interests and a balancing of those interests so as to ensure
fundamental fairness in the dealings and relations between the gov
ernment and its citizens.92 Consequently, due process, by its insis
tence upon the presence of certain procedural safeguards, serves to
equalize the contest between government and citizen. 93
C. Factors to be Evaluated

Many factors enter into the due process equation including the
nature of the interest adversely affected, the procedure employed,
90. State in Interest of L.G.w., 638 P.2d 527, 528 (Utah 1981). See Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932);
Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517,536-37 (1925). See also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 333, 348-49 (1976); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
123, 161-72 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
91. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972). See Paul v. Davis, 424
U.S. 693, 710-11 (1976); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-33 (1976).
92. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). See also Landon v.
Plasencia, 103 S. Ct. 321, 330, 331 (1982).
.
93. See Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18,27-28 (1981).
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and the balance between the conflicting interests. 94 The three major
factors, or elements, that must be evaluated and balanced in decid
ing what due process requires, are:
(a) the private interests affected by official action;
(b) the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interests by rea
son of the procedures employed, and the probable value of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
(c) the government's interest favoring retention of existing
procedures, including the function involved and the ad
ministrative and fiscal burdens that additional or substitute
procedural requirements would entai1. 95
A useful rule of thumb is that the nature and type of hearing
will determine the particular or applicable requirements of due pro
cess. 96 In other words, the nature of the governmental function in
volved and the type of private interest implicated by official action
will define what procedures due process will require. 97 Moreover,
the risk of error inherent in the truth-determining process as applied
to the generality of cases rather than to exceptional cases will shape
the nature of a due process hearing. 98 Therefore, where the risk of
error is potentially substantial, it should be guarded against by pro
cedural protections if such protections are not prohibitively costly.99
At some point, however, the benefit of an additional safeguard to the
individual affected may be outweighed by the cost involved. 1oo
Since the threat of an erroneous deprivation of the private inter
ests at stake is heightened by erroneous factual determinations and
legal conclusions, it is imperative that the hearing provided comport
with the need for fair dealings between the government and its citi
zens. But in order to ensure fairness in the relationships between
94. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
95. Landon v. Plasencia, 103 S. Ct. 321, 330 (1982); United States v. Raddatz, 447
U.S. 667, 677 (1980); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976); Nordgren v.
Mitchell, 524 F. Supp. 242,243 (D. Utah 1981); Young v. Whitworth, 522 F. Supp. 759,
762 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Wake County ex rel Carrington v. Townes, 293 S.E.2d 95, 98
(N.c. 1982); Major v. De French, 286 S.E.2d 688,698 (W. Va. 1982). Accord, Lassiter v.
Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18,27 (1981).
96. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348-49 (1976); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S.
565,578-80 (1975).
97. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886,
895 (1961).
98. Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 696 (1979).
99. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975).
100. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 542-43 (1981); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
651,682 (1977); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976).
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government and citizen, it is a fundamental dictate of due process
that the individual be heard in a meaningful manner.101 . It is pre
cisely in this setting that the presence of counsel takes on added
significance.
IV.
A.

THE RIGHT TO ApPOINTED COUNSEL

Introductory Comments

The focus of this study will now be on the right to appointed
counsel in the setting of a civil contempt proceeding for failure of an
indigent parent to comply with an order for child support. The arti
cle will analyze the competing interests of the individual in the free
dom, privacy, and security of his person, and those of the state in
securing adequate support for children from their parents, and in
preserving the authority and dignity of the courts in a manner that
will not impose upon society unreasonable administrative and fiscal
burdens. From this it will conclude that, while the interests of the
state are weighty, those of the individual in the liberty of his person
are sufficiently compelling to warrant the appointment of counsel as
a matter of constitutional precept, whenever an indigent defendant,
upon a finding of civil contempt, is deprived of his physical liberty.
Since the sixth amendment right to counsel is limited to crimi
nal proceedings,102 it is inapplicable to a civil contempt action. 103
Therefore, the right to appointed counsel in state civil contempt pro
ceedings must be found, if it exists, in the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment,l04 as an essential safeguard of a fair trial. 105
Reference to the criminal law is not without relevance, however, for
in either setting a defendant, upon a finding of guilt, will be con
fronted with the same danger: the loss of his freedom of movement
and action.
101. See Landon v. Plasencia, 103 S. Ct. 321, 331 (1982); Parratt v. Taylor, 451
U.S. 527, 540 (1981); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976); Armstrong v.
Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965); Downing v. Idaho, 103 Idaho 689, 692, 652 P.2d 193,
196 (1982).
102. See, e.g., Turner v. Steward, 497 F. Supp. 557, 558 (E.D. Ky. 1980).
103. Duval v. Duval, 114 N.H. 422, 425-26, 322 A.2d I, 3 (1974). See Sword v.
Sword, 399 Mich. 367, 380-81, 249 N.W.2d 88, 93 (1976); State ex reI. Department of
Human Servs. v. Rael, 97 N.M. 640, 643, 642 P.2d 1099, 1102 (1982); Jolly v. Wright, 300
N.C. 83, 90, 265 S.E.2d 135, 141 (1980).
104. McNabb v. Osmundson, 315 N.W.2d 9, II (Iowa 1982) (sixth amendment
considerations, however, may influence this determination); Duval v. Duval, 114 N.H.
422,426,322 A.2d 1,3 (1974).
105. See Mastin v. Fellerhoff, 526 F. Supp. 969, 971 (S.D. Ohio 1981).

1983]

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

617

B. Analysis and Discussion
In all criminal prosecutions, an indigent accused is entitled,
under the sixth 106 and fourteenth amendments to the federal Consti
tution, to the assistance of appointed counsel in his defense, if an
authorized term of imprisonment upon conviction is actually im
posed.107 The rationale of this requirement is that freedom from ar
bitrary deprivation of physical liberty is a fundamental liberty
interest under due process,108 and the presence of counsel is essential
to the integrity of the truth-determining process, so as to secure the
very existence of a fair trial before an indigent defendant may be
subjected to so severe a sanction as incarceration. 109 Similarly, due
process requires the assistance of counsel in nonsummary criminal
contempt proceedings 110 resulting in confinement. I 11
In view of this concern for "the core values of unqualified lib
erty,"112 the Supreme Court, in Lassiter v. Department ofSocial Serv
ices,l13 observed that there exists a presumptive right to appointed
counsel whenever an indigent litigant, "if he loses," may be deprived
of his "physicalliberty.""4 Moreover, all other elements in the due
process equation must be measured against this presumption. I 15
106. u.s. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.").
107. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25-27 (1981) (dictum);
Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979). See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25,37
38,40 (1972); id. at 41, 42 (Burger, C.l., concurring in result). This right to the assistance
of counsel arises from the sixth amendment, and is made applicable to the states through
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806,
818 (1975); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-44 (1963).
108. See Young v. Whitworth, 522 F. Supp. 759, 762 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
109. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31-34 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932). See also
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818 (1975).
110. Such proceedings involve contumacious behavior or conduct that is not com
mitted in open court, and in the presence and under the observation of the judge, and
which does not disturb the business of the court. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 275 (1948)
(dictum); Cooke v. United States 267 U.S. 517, 534 (1925) (dictum).
Ill. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 275-76 (1948); Cooke v. United States, 267
U.S. 517, 537 (1925); In re Stewart, 571 F.2d 958, 964 (5th Cir. 1978); In re DiBella, 518
F.2d 955, 959 (2d Cir. 1975) (dictum); State v. Roll, 267 Md. 714, 731 n.12, 298 A.2d 867,
877 n.12 (1973). And, it extends to proceedings for criminal nonsupport. See Arbo v.
Hegstrom, 261 F. Supp. 397,400-01 (D. Conn. 1966). One commentator has argued that
defendants summarily convicted of a direct criminal contempt and sentenced to impris
onment must be accorded the right to counsel. Kuhns, The Summary Contempt Power: A
Critique and a New Perspective, 88 YALE L.l. 39, 61-62 (1978).
112. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972).
113. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
114. Id. at 26-27.
115. Id. at 27.
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Authorities Rejecting the Appointment of Counsel

There is a split of authority concerning the constitutional right
to appointed counsel in civil contempt proceedings for nonsupport,
where the indigent defendant, upon a finding of contempt, is incar
cerated. Those courts that have rejected a per se requirement of
counsel have done so primarily on the rationale that because a con
tumacious indigent "carries the keys to his own prison," his liQerty
interest is not the "full-blown" liberty interest at stake in criminal
cases where the defendant does not control his incarceration. Fur
ther, since civil contempt is not a form of punishment, but rather a
civil remedy employed solely to enforce compliance with court or
ders, the threat of imprisonment is greatly diminished by the fact
that he will lose his liberty only if it is demonstrated that he pos
sesses sufficient resources to comply with the court order and has
failed to make arrangements to do SO.116 They have also argued
that, in the typical case, the legal and factual issues are not suffi
ciently complex to justify a per se appointment of counsell 17 but that
the right will attach if the lack of the assistance of counsel deprives
the indigent of a fundamentally fair hearing because of the complex
ity of the issues presented. IIB In addition, the argument has been
made that the accuracy of decision-making in most cases would not
be materially enhanced by the presence of appointed counsel.l 19 Fi
nally, the right to counsel has been rejected on the basis of the exor
bitant costs such a requirement would entail. 120
The collective position adopted by these courts is deficient for a
number of reasons. As one commentator has pointed out, judges
116. See State ex rel Department of Human Servs. v. Rael, 97 N.M. 640, 643, 644,
642 P.2d \099, 1\02, 1103 (1982). See also Meyer v. Meyer, 414 A.2d 236, 239 (Me.
1980); Sword v. Sword, 399 Mich. 367, 380-83, 249 N.W.2d 88, 93-94 (1976); Duval v.
Duval, 114 N.H. 422, 425-27, 322 A.2d 1,3-4 (1974); Jolly v. Wright, 300 N.C. 83,92-94,
265 S.E.2d 135, 142-43 (1980) (by implication); In re Calhoun, 47 Ohio St. 2d 15, 17-18,
350 N.E.2d 665, 666-67 (1976) (per curiam).
117. Sword v. Sword, 399 Mich. 367, 382, 249 N.W.2d 88, 93 (1976); State ex rel
Department of Human Servs. v. Rael, 97 N.M. 640, 644, 642 P.2d 1099, 1103 (1982); Jolly
v. Wright, 300 N.C. 83, 93-94, 265 S.E.2d 135, 143 (1980).
118. For examples of courts adopting an ad hoc approach, but generally disfavor
ing appointment of counsel, see Duval v. Duval, 114 N.H. 422, 426-27, 322 A.2d I, 4
(1974); State ex rel Department of Human Servs. v. Rae!, 97 N.M. 640, 644-45, 642 P.2d
\099, 1\03-04 (1982).
119. State ex rel Department of Human Servs. v. Rael, 97 N.M. 640, 644, 642 P.2d
1099, 1103 (1982).
120. Sword v. Sword, 399 Mich. 367, 381, 382-83, 249 N.W.2d 88, 93-94 (1976)
(such a requirement would more than double the number of appointed counsel in Michi
gan courts).
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rarely, if ever, inquire whether a parent in arrears has cash on hand
equal to the portion of the arrearage required for release, nor do they
release parents simply on a promise to commence payments. To this
observer, the real reasons for the refusal of some courts to require
the appointment of counsel for indigents in civil contempt proceed
ings are the costs of such a procedure and the realization that, with
counsel on the scene, it would be more difficult to incarcerate indi
viduals who are often viewed only as stereotypes in the absence of
legal representation, and for whom persons of respectability, their
atiorneys, start proposing individual plans of payment that appear to
be reasonable.l2I
Moreover, the implication of those courts adverse to the ap
pointment of counsel that the prospect or threat of incarceration is
more imaginary than real is quite unrealistic. It is true that the pur
pose of civil confinement is primarily coercive, whereas that of crim
inal imprisonment is punitive. 122 But whether the deprivation of
physical liberty be viewed as coercive or punitive, the end result is
the same, and the threat is realistically present in either type of pro
ceeding. For example, in Young v. Whitworth, 123 an unemployed
and unrepresented parent was ordered to jail for failure to obey an
order to pay $75 per week, to be applied both to child support and
the arrearage on back support. 124 In McNabb v. Osmundson,125 the
indigent parent, earning $35 to $40 weekly, was suffering from epi
lepsy and a drinking problem, owed debts totaling $316.40, and
owned no property or a motor vehicle. Nevertheless, the court's or
der required that he purge himself of contempt by paying $480 and
making weekly payments of $50, of which $30 was to be applied to
the current installment of child support and $20 to the arrearage. 126
These cases point up the ominous fact that parents in contempt of
court for noncompliance with support orders have been incarcerated
without regard to an inability to comply due to no fault on their
part. 127
Although it may be correct to say that the "overriding" interest
of the state in securing compliance with child-support orders is in
121.
187
122.
v. Duval;
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

PORT

D. CHAMBERS, MAKING FATHERS PAY: THE ENFORCEMENT OF CHILD Sup
(1979).
See Sword v. Sword, 399 Mich. 367, 380-81, 249 N.W.2d 88, 93 (1976); Duval
114 N.H. 422, 425, 322 A.2d I, 3 (1974).
522 F. Supp. 759 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
Id at 761 & n.2.
315 N.W.2d 9 (Iowa 1982).
Id at 10.
See D. CHAMBERS, supra note 121, at 247-48.
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protecting the financial welfare of children and not in punishing par
ents,128 the fact remains that a parent found in contempt of court for
nonsupport runs a very real risk of incarceration until he purges
himself of contempt. 129 His exposure to the threat of imprisonment
is clearly greater than it is for other defendants found to be in civil
contempt of court. For example, during 1969 and the first ten and a
half months of 1970, a total of 234 divorced men were sentenced in
Genesee County, Michigan, to jail for nonpayment of child-support
orders.13o In Macomb County, Michigan, during 1970, 309 fathers
were similarly incarcerated. l3l Not surprisingly, then, one commen
tator has noted that noncompliance with child-support orders has
resulted in the confinement in Michigan of thousands of parents
every year. 132
Any attempt to deny the right to appointed counsel on the basis
of the label attached to a contempt proceeding will not wash. For
purposes of due process analysis, what is implicated in contempt
cases is not the nature of the proceeding, but rather the liberty inter
est at stake. 133 It is the threat to the defendant's valued and funda
mental right to unqualified physical liberty that requires the
presence and assistance of counsel, which can be crucial to the out
come of a contempt hearing. '34 This threat is both real and mean
ingful in proceedings for either civil or criminal contempt.
Moreoever, the end result of incarceration will be just as traumatic
for, and will have the same impact on, a civil contemner as it will
have on a criminal defendant. The realities of the situation will be
equally grim and final in either case. The short of it is that the bur
den of imprisonment is as great in contempt cases as it is in criminal
prosecutions, that it is this fact which creates the need for procedural
. protection, and that the label attached to the proceeding resulting in,
or to the judicial order imposing, incarceration is simply irrelevant to
128. Sword v. Sword, 399 Mich. 367, 383, 249 N.W.2d 88, 94 (1976).
129. One commentator has reported that out of a particular group of 84 fathers in
Michigan made their first appearance in court on a show-cause order, sixty percent (60%)
were sentenced to jail. D. CHAMBERS, supra note 121, at 184. While this finding may be
atypical, it does point up the potential peril to which a parent charged with civil con
tempt is exposed.
130. Id at 294 (emphasis added).
131. Id at 297.
132. Id at 165.
133. See Mastin v. Fellerhoff, 526 F. Supp. 969, 972-73 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
134. C;: Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31-34 (1972) (counsel is required in
criminal prosecutions so that contest between government and individual may be equal
ized); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963) (same); Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932) (same).
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the need for counsel. 135
Similarly, tying the appointment of counsel to the complexity of
the case misses the mark, for, again, what is at stake, and is directly
threatened, is not the complexity of the issues, but rather the indi
gent's essential right to unqualified physical liberty. 136 It is precisely
this threat that gives rise to the presumptive right to appointed coun
sel.l37 When the threat of incarceration ripens into reality, it is the
deprivation of the individual's physical liberty which triggers the
right to appointed counsel as a constitutional absolute. 138
The most serious shortcoming in the reasoning of those courts
which have refused to recognize the existence of a constitutional
right to appointed counsel in civil contempt proceedings lies in their
insensitivity to the individual's liberty interest in the integrity of his
person and in their misconception of the importance and role of
counsel in a contempt hearing. Incarceration strips the individual of
his privacy, and substantially restricts his freedom of movement. It
requires him to submit to authority pursuant to a regimen that, while
primarily motivated by concerns for security, is calculated to seri
ously diminish his sense of self-worth. The overall effect is one of
depression, compounded by a lack of confidence in the future. In
deed, this attitude of defeat is not without justification, for imprison
ment for nonsupport can subject the individual to social opprobrium
and employment discrimination. 139
The assistance of counsel can be crucial to the outcome of a
135. See United States v. Anderson, 553 F.2d 1154, 1155-56 & n.2 (8th Cir. 1977)
(per curiam); In re DiBella, 518 F.2d 955, 958-59 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Sun
Kung Kang, 468 F.2d 1368, 1369 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam); Mastin v. Fellerhoff, 526
F. Supp. 969, 973 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Padilla v. Padilla, 645 P.2d 1327, 1328 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1982); McNabb v. Osmundson, 315 N.W.2d 9, II (Iowa 1982); Tetro v. Tetro, 86
Wash. 2d 252, 254-55, 544 P.2d 17, 19 (1975) (en banc). See also In re Kilgo, 484 F.2d
1215,1221 (4th Cir. 1973); Henkel v. Bradshaw, 483 F.2d 1386, 1389, 1390 (9th Cir. 1973)
(dictum); Young v. Whitworth, 522 F. Supp. 759, 762-63 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
136. See Mastin v. Fellerhoff, 526 F. Supp. 969,972 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
137. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18,26-27 (1981); Young v.
Whitworth, 522 F. Supp. 759, 764 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
138. Young v. Whitworth, 522 F. Supp. 759, 762-63 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Padilla v.
Padilla, 645 P.2d 1327, 1328 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982); McNabb v. Osmundson, 315 N.W.2d
9, 14 (Iowa 1982). See Henkel v. Bradshaw, 483 F.2d 1386, 1389, 1390 (9th Cir. 1973)
(dictum).
139. See D. CHAMBERS, supra note 121, at 243. Cj: Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103,
114 (1975) (pretrial confinement may imperil suspect's employment and interrupt his
source of income); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 & n.6 (1972) (criminal impris
onment can result in serious repercussions affecting reputation and career); In re Win
ship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970) (one convicted of crime will be "stigmatized by the
conviction").
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contempt hearing. Typically, the defendant will be brought into
court on a "show cause" order, requiring him, in practical effect, to
shoulder the burden of persuading the court why he should not be
found in contempt after his noncompliance has been established.
His attorney can conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant's
financial condition and obtain the witnesses to support his story. In
addition, counsel will be able to research the legal issues involved in
the case, and to bring to his client's cause professional expertise in
the procedural and substantive complexities of the law. Thus, at the
hearing, counsel will be able to marshal witnesses and offer evidence
supportive of the defendant's position and to present a coherent and
credible defense in behalf of his client. l40 Accordingly, the presence
of counsel will serve to reduce the potential for erroneous depriva
tion of the defendant's physical liberty, a function also served by the
presence of counsel in criminal cases,141 and to affect significantly
the outcome of the proceeding.142 Finally, in the event of a finding
of contempt, counsel may be able to work out a payment plan, or a
schedule of payments, that will be sufficiently satisfactory to the
court to keep the defendant out of prison. 143
2.

Authorities Endorsing the Appointment of Counsel

A number of courts have endorsed a per se requirement of ap
pointed counsel for indigent defendants who are incarcerated upon a
finding of civil contempt. The leading authority for this position is
Young v. Whitworth .144 In Young, an indigent father filed an appli
cation for a writ of habeas corpus after he was adjudged in civil con
tempt of state court for failure to comply with an order for child
support. He alleged that he had been denied constitutional process
because he had been incarcerated without ever being advised of his
right to appointed counsel and because he was not provided with
such counsel. In denying a motion to dismiss the application, the
140. See Young v. Whitworth, 522 F. Supp. 759, 762-63 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Com
ment, The Indigent Defendant's Right to Court-Appointed Counsel in Civil Contempt Pro
ceedingsfor Nonpayment of Child Support, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 326, 343 (1983). See also
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31-34 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,
344-45 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
141. See Young v. Whitworth, 522 F. Supp. 759, 762-63 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
142. See D. CHAMBERS, supra note 121, at 185-87 (reporting that, in a random
sample of parents brought into court for the first time for nonsupport, only twenty per
cent (20%) of those who were represented by counsel were jailed, whereas incarceration
befell approximately two-thirds of those who were unrepresented).
143. See id at 185-86.
144. 522 F. Supp. 759 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
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federal court found that if the indigent had not been advised of his
right to appointed counsel, or that such counsel had not been pro
vided at his request, due process would be violated, and the peti
tioner father would be entitled to federal habeas relief. 145
The court began its discussion by noting that due process analy
sis is "bilateral." First, it must be determined whether a protected
liberty or property interest is at stake. If such an interest is identi
fied,. then the next step is to decide what process is required before
the interest may be deprived. 146 That there was a protected interest
in this case, was not seriously doubted by the court. "In this case
such an interest is so clear as to require no further discussion."147
Concerning the second issue, the court observed that a determination
of whether appointed counsel was necessary would require a balanc
ing of three factors:
(a) the private interest affected by the official action (peti
tioner's liberty);
(b) the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures employed, "and the probable value, if any,
of additional or substitute procedural safeguards"; and
(c) the government's interest, including the function involved
and the administrative and fiscal burdens that additional
or substitute procedural requirements would entail. 148
The court characterized "liberty" as a "lofty and majestic term."
Thus, the concept of physical liberty, the rudimentary freedom to
move about without restraint, is at the "heart" of our democracy. 149
It is because of this "core" value that an individual should not be
deprived of physical liberty in the absence of a full panoply of proce
dural protections, including the right to appointed counsel, unless
competing interests "absolutely" require that such procedures not be
employed. 150 Here, the court felt that the potential for erroneous
deprivation of petitioner'S fundamental liberty interest was "very
similar" to the risk of an erroneous result in criminal prosecutions. 151
Therefore, providing indigent parents with "'the guiding hand of
counsel' " would reduce the potential for error related to misunder
standing legal issues and lack of expertise in marshalling and analyz
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id at 761.
Id at 762.
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
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ing facts.152 Furthermore, because of the "extreme weight" to be
given to the individual's liberty interest in his freedom of movement
and action, even a modest reduction in the potential for error in the
deprivation of that interest would justify the imposition of appointed
counsel. 153
. The court next examined the government's interest in this case,
and found it to be significant. It noted that it is in the public interest
for parents to be required to provide adequate support for their chil
dren, thereby relieving society of this burden. In addition, it is in the
interest of both the public and the courts to have judicial mandates
obeyed by those within their jurisdiction. 154 While these interests
are weighty, the court did not feel that they would be obstructed by
the requirement of appointed counsel. "When situations arise in
which it is legitimate for a parent not to provide support, the public
must be charitable and the courts fiexible."155 While not attempting
to define such situations, the court did recognize that, when legal and
factual issues of this nature are raised, the imposition of appointed
counsel would not infringe upon the legitimate interests of
government. 156
In addressing the fiscal and administrative burdens that would
be imposed on a state judicial system by the requirement of ap
pointed counsel, the court frankly acknowledged that it would be
"inane" to try to underestimate the impact such a process would
have, and conceded that the fiscal and administrative burdens ac
companying the imposition of counsel would be "heavy" and even
"severe." The court remained convinced, however, that "the funda
mental nature of physical liberty requires the imposition of this
burden." 157
The court, in Young, felt that this result was "very nearly man
dated"158 by Argersinger v. Hamlin , 159 requiring counsel under the
sixth amendment in any criminal prosecution where the individual
would be deprived of his physical liberty, by In re Gault, 160 requiring
counsel in juvenile delinquency proceedings, and by Lassiter v. De
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id at 763 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932}).
522 F. Supp. at 763.
Id
Id
Id
Id Accord, McNabb v. Osmundson, 315 N.W.2d 9, 16 (Iowa 1982).
522 F. Supp. at 763.
407 U.S. 25 (1972).
389 U.S. 1 (1967).
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partment of Social Services,161 where the Supreme Court recognized
that the deprivation of physical liberty presumptively implicates the
right to appointed counsel. I62 In these cases, as well as in criminal
contempt actions, the deprivation of physical liberty, and not the la
bel attached to the proceedings, was deemed controlling. Conse
quently, the overwhelming weight of the liberty interest at stake
mandated the appointment of counsel. 163 To the Young court, this
interest is equally implicated in civil contempt proceedings where an
individual faces imprisonment upon a finding of contumacious con
duct. Thus, the court could find no justification for requiring a dif
ferent rule in civil contempt cases l64 and therefore concluded that,
when an indigent is faced with incarceration on civil contempt
charges, due process compels the appointment of counsel. 165
The result dictated in Young has been endorsed by other courts.
In Mastin v. Fe//erhojf,166 plaintiff sought to enjoin a state domestic
relations court from incarcerating him or any other indigent person
found in contempt of court for failure to pay child support without
first informing them of their right to have counsel appointed if they
were unable to afford retained counsel and without first appointing
counsel to those indigents who requested such assistance. The par
ties agreed that the action would be decided upon motions for sum
mary judgment, and the issue raised was whether due process was
violated by the practice of the domestic relations court of incarcerat
ing indigent persons for civil contempt without first appointing coun
sel to represent them. 167 In finding that such practice constituted a
denial of procedural due process, the court emphasized that the focal
point of inquiry in any case in which the individual's fundamental
liberty interest has been implicated is the threatened loss of physical
161. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
162. 522 F. Supp. at 763-64.
163. Id
164. Id at 764-65.
165. Id at 765-66. The Young court refused to adopt an ad hoc complexity-of
issues approach to the appointment of counsel, as was done by the Supreme Court in
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787-90 (1973), to govern the requirement of counsel in
parole revocation proceedings, by distinguishing Gagnon primarily on the basis of the
conditional liberty of a parolee in contrast to the indigent parent's "full-fledged liberty at
stake." 522 F. Supp. at 765. Accord, Mastin v. Fellerhotf, 526 F. Supp. 969, 973 (S.D.
Ohio 1981); McNabb v. Osmundson, 315 N.W.2d 9, 14 (Iowa 1982). But see Sword v.
Sword, 399 Mich. 367, 381, 249 N.W.2d 88, 93 (1976). Seealso Duval v. Duval, 114 N.H.
422,426, 322 A.2d I, 3-4 (1974).
166. 526 F. Supp. 969 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
167. Id at 970.
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freedom and not the nature of the proceeding. 168 Applying this
yardstick to the facts developed in this case led the court to the ines
capable conclusion that a state may not deprive a person of his phys
ical liberty unless that person has been provided with appointed
counsel. 169
To the Mastin court, characterizing a proceeding as civil rather
than criminal was "a distinction without a difference if the end result
is loss of physical liberty." 170 Whenever a proceeding may result in
imprisonment, reasoned the court, appointment of counsel is a due
process absolute, justifying exemption from the balancing-of-inter
ests test developed in Mathews v. Eldndge,l7l a test applicable only
where the right at issue is not absolute. 172 It is this loss of an "abso
lute liberty interest" that differentiates the per se requirement of
counsel in contempt proceedings from the case-by-case analysis ap
plicable to situations where either no liberty or a conditional liberty
interest is at stake.173
Even assuming, however, that the Eldridge balancing test was
applicable, the court still found that the interests of indigents facing
imprisonment in civil contempt proceedings "so far outweigh the in
terests of the state," and the risk of an erroneous decision is "so
great, that a right to appointed counsel clearly exists in all cases." 174
Accordingly, the court, in Mastin, concluded that due process re
quires the appointment of counsel in civil contempt actions when
ever indigent litigants "may be deprived of their physical liberty." 175
Although acknowledging some reluctance to impose "such a burden
on the state system," the court believed, nevertheless, that the federal
Constitution "requires no less."176
The federal circuits that have had an opportunity to comment
on the issue of appointed counsel in civil contempt cases have recog
nized that, absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, the right of a
168. See id at 972-73.
169. ld at 973.
170. Id
171. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See supra text accompanying note 95.
172. 526 F. Supp. at 973.
173. Id at 972-73. For examples of the case-by-case analysis involving no loss of
an absolute libeny interest, see Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18
(1981) (parental tennination proceedings); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (ter
mina1ion of Social Security disability benefit payments); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S.
778 (1973) (probation revocation proceedings).
174. 526 F. Supp. at 973 (emphasis added).
175. Id
176. ld
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defendant in a criminal prosecution not to be imprisoned for any
offense without the assistance of counsel extends to contempt pro
ceedings, either civil or criminal. The rationale of these authorities
is that the burden of imprisonment is as great in contempt proceed
ings as it is in criminal cases, that it is this fact which creates the need
for procedural protection, and that the label attached to the judicial
order that imposes incarceration is simply irrelevant to the need for
counsel. 177
Various state courts have endorsed the right to appointed coun
sel in civil contempt proceedings, where indigent litigants are de
prived of their personal freedom. The Supreme Courts of Alaska
and Washington, for instance, have done so on the basis of finding
no constitutional distinction between civil and criminal incarcera
tion,178 The Iowa Supreme Court has also found a right to ap
pointed counsel in civil contempt proceedings that result in, or in
which there exists "a significant likelihood" of, the deprivation of
physicalliberty.179 Similarly, the Colorado Court of Appeals has en
dorsed the right to appointed counsel in any contempt proceeding
that results in imprisonment. 18o In addition, the Montana Supreme
Court has recognized that one charged with civil contempt of court
has the right to be represented by counsel,l81 The Utah Supreme
Court has acknowledged that, in non summary contempt proceed
ings, due process requires that the person charged be accorded the
assistance of counsel, if so requested. 182
177. See United States v. Anderson, 553 F.2d 1154, 1155-56 & n.2 (8th Cir. 1977)
(per curiam); In re DiBella, 518 F.2d 955, 958-59 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Sun
Kung Kang, 468 F.2d 1368, 1369 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam). See a/so United States v.
Bobart Travel Agency, Inc., 699 F.2d 618, 620-21 (2d Cir. 1983); In re Kilgo, 484 F.2d
1215, 1221 (4th Cir. 1973); Henkel v. Bradshaw, 483 F.2d 1386, 1389, 1390 (9th Cir. 1973)
(dictum).
178. Otton v. Zaborac, 525 P.2d 537, 539-40 (Alaska 1974); Tetro v. Tetro, 86
Wash. 2d 252, 254-55, 544 P.2d 17, 19-20 (1975) (en banc).
179. McNabb v. Osmundson, 315 N.W.2d 9,14 (Iowa 1982)

[N)ebulous distinctions between civil and criminal contempts are of no conse
quence ...[, for) [t)he jail doors clang with the same finality behind an indigent
who is held in contempt and incarcerated for nonpayment of child support. . .
as they do behind an indigent who is incarcerated for violation of a criminal
statute.
Id. at II (citation omitted).
180. Padilla v. Padilla, 645 P.2d 1327, 1328 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982).
181. Lilienthal v. District Court, 650 P.2d 779, 782 (Mont. 1982). Accord, Millerv.
Carson, 550 F. Supp. 543, 545 (M.D. Fla. 1982) (dictum); Hendershot v. Handlan, 248
S.E.2d 273, 282 (W. Va. 1978) (Miller, J., concurring & dissenting) (dictum).
182. Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320, 1322 (Utah 1982).
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The Need for Counsel

Few rights are more cherished in Anglo-American law than the
right to the assistance of counsel. This assistance is of such signifi
cance that in many cases the right to be heard would be of little avail
if it did not also include the right to be heard by counsel. Few lay
men, even those who are educated and intelligent, have any skill in
the intricaci.es of legal theory and procedure. They will be incapa
ble, as a practical matter, of avoiding pitfalls in legal practice. Left
to their own resources, they may not know how to proceed properly,
how to grapple with thorny legal issues, or how to apply rigorous
factual and legal analysis to the pleadings. In short, they lack both
the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare a defense and face the
danger of losing because they do not know how to establish their
innocence. 183
The assistance of counsel is not a sterile concept. It is both vital
and meaningful and serves to balance the scales in the contest be
tween government and citizen. 184 That this is so cannot be seriously
doubted. 18s Thus, for example, the presence of counsel serves to re
duce the potential for erroneous deprivation of an essential liberty
interest under due process l86 and to affect significantly the outcome
of a legal proceeding. 187 Moreoever, an erroneous result will have
an impact not only upon the liberty interest threatened but also may
result in a defendant being subjected to social opprobrium and em
ployment discrimination. 188
It is precisely because the individual's interest in personal free
dom is such a valued liberty interest under due process l89 that a dep
rivation of that freedom, and not simply the sixth amendment right
to counsel in criminal prosecutions, will trigger the right to ap
183. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31-34 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932). See also
Young v. Whitworth, 522 F. Supp. 759, 762-63 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
184. See Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18,27-28 (1981).
185. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963); Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
186. See Mastin v. Fellerhoff, 526 F. Supp. 969, 973 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Young v.
Whitworth, 522 F. Supp. 759, 762-63 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
187. See D. CHAMBERS, supra note 121, at 185-87.
188. See id at 243.
189. Mastin v. Fellerhoff, 526 F. Supp. 969, 972 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Young v. Whit
worth, 522 F. Supp. 759, 762 (S.D. Ohio 1981) ("such ... [a protected liberty) interest is
so clear as to require no further discussion"). See McNabb v. Osmundson, 315 N.W.2d
9,11-12 (Iowa 1982); Tetro v. Tetro, 86 Wash. 2d 252, 254-55, 544 P.2d 17, 19 (1975) (en
banc).
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pointed counsel. 190 This approach demonstrates that what is of con
stitutional significance for purposes of procedural due process is not
the label attached to a hearing but rather the consequences to the
individual arising from an adverse ruling rendered at the hearing.
Under this analysis, it becomes readily apparent that incarceration
for a civil contempt is identical to a deprivation of physical liberty
for either a criminal contempt or a criminal offense. In either in
stance, the individual's liberty interest has been equally ruptured,
and it is of no import that the purpose or function of one sanction
may be coercive while that of the other is remedial. In either in
stance, the loss of liberty is equally total and traumatic. 191
Before an individual may be deprived of his physical liberty
under due process, he must be accorded a reasonable opportunity to
be heard. 192 This opportunity, however, will be of little avail, unless
the individual can be heard in a meaningful manner.193 It is pre
cisely for this reason that the assistance of counsel is crucial to the
fairness of a hearing under due process. 194
In assessing the need for counsel in any proceeding in which an
indigent litigant, if he loses, may be deprived of his physical free
dom, a court should be particularly sensitive to the fundamental na
ture of the liberty interest at stake. The concept of physical liberty,
the rudimentary freedom to move about without restraint, is at the
"heart" of our democracy. It is because of this "core" value that an
individual should not be deprived of his physical liberty in the ab
190. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18,25 (1981); Mastin v. Fe1
lerhoff, 526 F. Supp. 969, 973 (S.D. Ohio 1981). In Lassiter, the Supreme Court drew
support for this interpretation from the fact that counsel will be appointed in juvenile
delinquency proceedings, even though designated "civil," In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,36,41
(1967), and where proceedings are instituted for the involuntary transfer of an indigent
prisoner to a state mental hospital, Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1980) (plurality
opinion). 452 U.S. at 25.
191. See Mastin v. Fellerhoff, 526 F. Supp. 969, 973 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Olton v.
Zaborac, 525 P.2d 537, 539-40 (Alaska 1974); McNabb v. Osmundson, 315 N.W.2d 9, II
(Iowa 1982); Tetro v. Tetro, 86 Wash. 2d 252,254-55,544 P.2d 17, 19 (1975) (en banc).
In Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the Court observed that among the
factors to be considered in assessing the constitutional validity of a decision-making pro
cess is "the degree of potential deprivation that may be created by a particular deci
sion. . . ." Id at 341 (emphasis added).
192. See Young v. Whitworth, 522 F. Supp. 759, 762 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
193. See Landon v. Plasencia, 103 S. Ct. 321, 331 (1982); Parralt v. Taylor, 451
U.S. 527, 540 (1981); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976); Armstrong v.
Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965); Downing v. Department of Health & Welfare, 652 P.2d
193, 196 (Idaho 1982).
194. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31-34 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
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sence of a full panoply of procedural protections, including the right
to appointed counsel, unless compelling interests "absolutely" re
quire that such procedures not be employed. 195
Although competing governmental interests, such as fiscal and
administrative burdens, the need for compliance with judicial man
dates, and the public interest in securing adequate support from par
ents for their children, are both significant and weighty, the
requirement of appointed counsel in proceedings for civil contempt
will not hinder or unreasonably affect these legitimate interests. 196
But even if the requirement of counsel places a "heavy," or even
"severe," burden on the fiscal and administrative resources of the
state,197 the fundamental nature of the liberty interest at stake, and
the awesome consequences to the individual arising from an errone
ous deprivation of that interest, so far outweigh the interests of the
state as to require the imposition of this burden if the indigent liti
gant, upon losing the contest, is actually deprived of his physical lib
erty.198 A criminal prosecution requires as much;199 a civil
prosecution for contempt can require no less.
The potential for erroneous deprivation of a liberty interest in a
contempt proceeding is "very similar" to the risk of an erroneous
result in a criminal prosecution. 2°O There is no reason to believe that
legal and constitutional issues, as well as factual analyses, are less
complex in civil contempt proceedings than they are in criminal con
tempt actions or in juvenile delinquency cases; yet in each the assist
ance of counsel is required. 201 Thus, providing indigent parents with
"the guiding hand of counsel"202 will reduce the potential for error
related to misunderstanding legal issues and lack of expertise in mar
shalling evidence and analyzing facts.203 Furthermore, because of
the "extreme weight" to be given the individual's liberty interest in
his physical freedom, even a modest reduction in the potential for
error in the deprivation of that interest will justify the imposition of
195. Young v. Whitworth, 522 F. Supp. 759, 762 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
196. Id at 763. See Comment, supra note 140, at 344-45.
197. Young v. Whitworth, 522 F. Supp. 759, 763 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
198. Mastin v. Fellerhotf, 526 F. Supp. 969, 973 (S.D. Ohio 1981): See Young v.
Whitworth, 522 F. Supp. 759, 763 (S.D. Ohio 1981). See also Lassiter v. Department of
Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18,25-27 (1981).
199. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367,373-74 (1979). See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25, 37-38,40 (1972); id at 42 (Burger, C.)., concurring in result).
200. Young v. Whitworth, 522 F. Supp. 759, 762 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
201. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36, 41 (1967) (juvenile delinquency case); In re Di
Bella, 518 F.2d 955,959 (2d Cir. 1975) (dictum as to criminal contempt actions).
202. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
203. Young v. Whitworth, 522 F. Supp. 759, 763 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
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appointed counsel.204 Similarly, the presence of counsel may affect
significantly an indigent's ultimate risk of incarceration. 205 It is sub
mitted, therefore, that there exists no legitimate objection to, or sub
stitute for, the requirement of appointed counsel.
In summary, the need for counsel in civil contempt proceedings
resulting in the deprivation of physical liberty is compelling, and is
supported by the fundamental nature of the liberty interest at stake,
the reduced potential for error as a result of the presence of counsel,
the significant impact such presence may have upon the ultimate
outcome of the proceeding, and the lack of hindrance of competing
governmental interests because of the requirement of appointed
counsel.
In a democratic society, the freedom of the individual, while not
absolute, is central to an enlightened concept of equal justice under
law. Whenever that freedom must be forfeited, it should be accom
plished pursuant to civilized procedures that make the commitment
to the integrity of the individual a meaningful experience and not
simply an empty promise. 206 Therefore, a defendant in a civil con
tempt proceeding should not be deprived of his physical liberty,
upon a finding of guilt, without benefit of the prior assistance of
counsel, either retained or appointed. If he can afford counsel of his
own choice, he should be accorded a reasonable opportunity to do
so. If he cannot afford retained counsel, then, subject only to a
knowing and intelligent waiver,207 counsel should be appointed for
him.
C.

Standardfor Appointment of Counsel

When a court is confronted with a civil contempt proceeding
against an indigent parent for noncompliance with an order for child
support, it must assess, with care, the potential for incarceration in
the event of a finding of guilt. A failure to do so will increase the
204. Id.
205. See D. CHAMBERS, supra note 121, at 185-86.
206. Cj: Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 449 (1962) (the quality of a
civilization may properly be judged by the methods employed in the enforcement of its
criminal law); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54-55 (1949) (plurality opinion) (procedural
safeguards employed by accusatorial system of criminal justice protect individuals froni
governmental oppression); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343-47 (1943) (same
as Cooppedge and Wails); Schaefer, supra note 78, at 25-26 (American standards of jus
tice, which reflect the quality of our civilization, implement a concept of due process that
seeks to protect the individual from unjust punishment).
207. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975); Argersinger v. Hamlin,
407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972); State v. Reed, 174 Conn. 287, 293, 386 A.2d 243, 248 (1978).
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risk of a court having to abort the proceeding in the event that it
does decide to incarcerate an unrepresented indigent, because no in
dividual may be imprisoned unless he is represented by counsel. Ac
cordingly, if a court wishes to preserve the option of incarceration,
then it must be prepared, first, to weigh the factors that will influence
a decision of confinement and, second, to both advise the indigent of
his right to appointed counsel and to provide him with such counsel,
unless properly waived, if there exists a sufficient likelihood of im
prisonment. This will require of the court "a predictive evaluation"
of the case. 208
The courts are not in agreement as to what standard of "predic
tive evaluation" a court must apply in determining whether an indi
gent litigant, if he loses, will be deprived of his physical liberty. In
Argersinger v. Hamlin ,209 Chief Justice Burger, while concurring in
the result, applied a "significant likelihood," or reasonable
probability, standard to criminal prosecutions. 2lo The Iowa
Supreme Court has applied this standard to civil contempt proceed
ings, in reliance upon the Chief Justice's position in Argersinger. 211
Other courts, however, appear to have adopted a reasonable possi
bility standard for the appointment of counsel.2 12 The better stan
dard, and the one that more equitably balances the competing
interests involved, is the reasonable probability test. By "reasonable
probability" is meant that there exists a fair reason under the facts
for entertaining such a belief. 213 Thus, a reasonable probability that
an event will take place or happen signifies that the event is reason
ably likely to occur.214 Although this standard requires more than a
mere possibility or speculation,2ls it does not require a reasonable
certainty.216
Actual incarceration is a penalty different in kind from the mere
threat of incarceration or the imposition of fines. Thus, in a criminal
208. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 42 (1972) (Burger, C.J., concurring in
result) (test endorsed for appointment of counsel in criminal prosecutions).
209. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
210. Id. at 42 (Burger, C.J., concurring in result).
211. McNabb v. Osmundson, 315 N.W.2d 9, 14 (Iowa 1982).
212. See Mastin v. Fellerhoff, 526 F. Supp. 969, 973 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Tetro v.
Tetro, 86 Wash. 2d 252, 254-55, 544 P.2d 17, 19-20 (1975) (en bane). See also Young v.
Whitworth, 522 F. Supp. 759, 765-66 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
213. See Mims v. State, 141 Ala. 93, 95-96, 37 So. 354, 354 (1904); Williams v.
Lumpkin, 169 Miss. 146, 152, 152 So. 842, 844 (1934).
214. See Johnson v. Connecticut Co., 85 Conn. 438, 441,83 A. 530, 531 (1912).
215. See Hallum v. Village ofOmro, 122 Wis. 337, 344, 99 N.W. 1051, 1054 (1904).
216. See Johnson v. Connecticut Co., 85 Conn. 438, 440-42, 443-44, 83 A. 530, 531
32 (1912).
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prosecution, the line of demarcation for the constitutional right to
appointed counsel is at the point of actual imprisonment. 217 Accord
ingly, and because "any deprivation of liberty is a serious matter,"218
the burden imposed upon the states by the requirement of appointed
counsel before an indigent defendant may be incarcerated must be
assumed regardless of the costs imposed by such a rule. 219 To go
beyond this requirement of actual incarceration in a criminal pro
ceeding, and to insist upon the need for counsel because of exposure
of an alleged civil contemner to the threat of imprisonment, which is
the test for the reasonable possibility standard,220 would do violence
to the rationale of Scott v. Illinois. 221 It would also undercut the rule
of presumptive right to appointed counsel announced in Lassiter v.
Department of Social Services ,222 and would result in a constitutional
anomaly, in that a defendant in a civil contempt proceeding would
be accorded a greater right to appointed counsel than a defendant
possesses in a criminal prosecution. 223
In Lassiter, the Supreme Court observed that there exists a pre
sumptive right to appointed counsel whenever an indigent litigant,
"if he loses," may be deprived of his "physical liberty."224 The
Court was also careful to note, however, that "as a litigant's interest
in personal liberty diminishes, so does his right to appointed coun
sel."225 Similarly, as the danger of actual deprivation of physical
liberty diminishes, so too, does the right to appointed counsel.
Therefore, exposure to the threat of incarceration does not warrant
imposition of a requirement of counsel.226
A rule requiring the appointment of counsel upon a mere rea
sonable possibility of confinement has another, more practical,
drawback. Such a requirement would subject the states to an op
217. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979). See Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 37
38,40; id. at 41-42 (Burger, C.l., concurring in result).
218. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 41 (Burger, C.l., concurring in the result).
219. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 372-73 (1979).
220. See Mastin v. Fellerhoff, 526 F. Supp. 969, 973 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Tetro v.
Tetro, 86 Wash. 2d 252, 254-55, 544 P.2d 17, 19-20 (1975) (en banc).
221. 440 U.S. 367, 372-73 (1979).
222. 452 U.S. 18,26-27 (1981).
223. See McNabb v. Osmundson, 315 N.W.2d 9, 14 (Iowa 1982) (if right to ap
pointed counsel in criminal cases "attaches" only when actual imprisonment is imposed,
then a higher standard will not be imposed by the Supreme Court in a civil proceeding in
which an indigent is not actually incarcerated).
224. 452 U.S. at 26-27.
225. Id. at 26.
226. See Henkel v. Bradshaw, 483 F.2d 1386, 1389 (9th Cir. 1973) (dictum); Mc
Nabb v. Osmundson, 315 N.W.2d 9, 14 (Iowa 1982).
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pressive burden. For example, in Michigan it has been estimated
that the requirement of appointed counsel for all indigents in civil
contempt cases probably would result in more than doubling the
number of appointed counsel in judicial proceedings. 227 This is what
would occur, however, under the reasonable possibility standard, for
this standard would require a court to appoint counsel in virtually all
cases, on the theory that the threat of imprisonment was an implic
itly realistic ingredient of any civil contempt proceeding for an un
reasonable disobedience of a support order. This, in turn, would
lead to prolonged hearings and substantially increase the govern
ment's financial burdens. 228
Finally, the reasonable possibility standard would inflict a need
less hardship upon the states, because in many prosecutions for civil
contempt, the defendant, even if adjudged to be in contempt, will not
be subjected to actual imprisonment. Incarceration for civil con
tempt is a proper sanction only if a court can find that the alleged
contemner has unreasonably failed to comply with the order,229
while retaining the present ability to bring himself into
compliance. 23o
This is not to say that a defendant in a civil contempt proceed
ing is without danger of imprisonment. The threat of confinement
will always be present, although it may be drastically reduced, if not
actually eliminated, by having the show-cause order served upon the
defendant recite that imprisonment is not presently indicated or con
templated. 231 Since, however, it is the individual's interest in his
physical liberty that triggers the right to, and the need for, appointed
counsel,232 the assistance of counsel, while always beneficial, will not
be constitutionally required where that liberty interest is neither ma
terially implicated nor jeopardized. Conversely, if a court wishes to
impose a sentence of confinement, the defendant will be secure in his
liberty interest by the constitutional guarantee that he cannot be in
carcerated unless he is represented by counsel.
The reasonable probability standard for the appointment of
counsel will avoid an undue burden to the states without infringing
227. Sword v. Sword, 399 Mich. 367, 382-83, 249 N.W.2d 88, 94 (1976) (an esti
mated 25,000 support cases are added annually to files of domestic relations enforcement
officers and there remain until all children affected attain age of eighteen).
228. Id at 381, 382-83, 249 N.W.2d at 93, 94. See State ex reI. Department of
Human Servs. v. Rael, 97 N.M. 640, 644, 642 P.2d 1099, 1103 (1982).
229. See supra text accompanying notes 65-74.
230. See. e.g., Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 371 (1966).
231. See Henkel v. Bradshaw, 483 F.2d 1386, 1390 n.8 (9th Cir. 1973) (dictum).
232. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 25.
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upon the individual's fundamental interest in his personal freedom.
It will function as an accurate barometer of the indigent's need for
counsel, while reducing the incidence of aborted contempt proceed
ings arising from a belated decision to incarcerate an unrepresented
indigent. At the same time, it will relieve the states of the unneces
sary burden of providing counsel in those cases which do not result
in imprisonment. In these particulars, the standard will equitably
accommodate and balance the competing interests of the indigent
and the state. Therefore, while there is no constitutional mandate
for the appointment of counsel on the basis of a reasonable
probability or significant likelihood of incarceration, practical neces
sity dictates such a requirement.
In assessing the reasonable probability of incarceration, a court
must necessarily engage in "a predictive evaluation" without
prejudging the controversy.233 While not reducible to mathematical
certitude, such an assessment is capable of producing a reasonably
accurate result. 234 Among the pertinent factors that may be consid
ered are the reasons for noncompliance with the order of support,
the indigent litigant's ability to have complied with the order during
the period or periods of nonpayment, the litigant's payment record,
his attitudinal response to attempts by domestic relations officers to
effect voluntary compliance with the support order, the indigent's
current employment status and capability of being employed, the
amount of arrearage, the present ability of the litigant to come into
substantial compliance with the support order, the indigent's record
of previous contempt or show-cause hearings for noncompliance,
and the recommendation, if any, of the domestic relations officer as
signed to the case. 235 Primary consideration, however, should be
given to the litigant's present ability to comply with the support or
der, for the purpose of contempt proceedings for noncompliance
with child support decrees or orders is to coerce the defendant into
compliance, not to punish him for past misconduct. 236 Similarly,
233. (f Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 42 (Burger, c.J., concurring in result) (endorsing
this approach for criminal prosecutions).
234.
id. at 40 (opinion of the Court) (prior to criminal trial, a judge "will have a
[sufficient] measure of the seriousness and gravity" of the accusation to know when to
appoint counsel), and id. at 42 (Burger, c.J., concurring in result) ("the prediction is not
one beyond the capacity of an experienced judge. . . .").
235. See D. CHAMBERS, supra note 121, at 212 (report of enforcement officer to
court, Genesee County, Michigan).
236. Ryfeul v. Ryfeul, 650 P.2d 369, 375 (Alaska 1982). See Sword v. Sword, 399
Mich. 367, 391-92, 249 N.W.2d 88, 98 (1976) (Levin, J., concurring) (consideration of
past misconduct would be inconsistent with premise that civil contemner, who carries the
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justification for coercive imprisonment in civil contempt proceedings
depends upon the contemner's current ability to comply with the
court's order. Once that ability ceases to exist, incarceration must
end. 237
A court may pursue the following, but not. exclusive, lines of
inquiry in assessing the present ability of an alleged contemner to
comply with a support order:
(a) the accuracy of the alleged arrearage;
(b) defendant's education and skills;
(c) available employment opportunities;
(d) diligence employed by defendant in seeking work, as well
as his availability for work;
(e) defendant's employment history, including reasons for ter
mination of employment;
(f) personal history of defendant including health and physical
ability to obtain gainful employment, as well as present
means of support and marital status;
(g) assets, both real and personal, and liabilities of defendant,
and any transfers of assets; and
(h) efforts previously made by defendant to modify support
order for being excessive under the circumstances. 238
If the inquiry reveals an arrearage and the reason or reasons for
noncompliance, then the court must determine whether the defend
ant has sufficient present ability to comply with the order, or by the
exercise of due diligence could do SO,239 and has unreasonably failed
to do SO.24O

v.

CONCLUSION

There is a compelling need for the presence of counsel before an
keys of his prison, may not be incarcerated if he does not have ability to comply with
order); Spalter v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 35 Mich. App. 156, 161, 192 N.W.2d 347, 349
(1971). See also Johansen v. State, 491 P.2d 759,766 (Alaska 1971) (court may also
consider whether defendant has asserted inability to comply with support order).
237. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 371 (1966).
238. See Sword v. Sword, 399 Mich. 367, 378-79, 249 N.W.2d 88, 92 (1976) (find
ing error in trial court's attempt to limit test of ability to comply solely to physical abil
ity). See also McDaniel v. McDaniel, 256 Md. 684, 693-94, 262 A.2d 52, 57-58 (1970);
Hopp v. Hopp, 279 Minn. 170, 176-77, 156 N.W.2d 212, 217-18 (1968); State ex rel
Houtchens v. District Court, 122 Mont. 76, 82-83, 199 P.2d 272, 275 (1948); 2 W. NEL
SON, supra note 57, at § 16.25, at 435-38.
239. Aspira of New York, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 423 F. Supp. 647, 654 (S.D.N.Y.
1976); Sword v. Sword, 399 Mich. 367, 379, 249 N.W.2d 88, 92 (1976). See Shillitani v.
United States, 384 U.S. 364, 371 (1966).
240. See supra text accompanying notes 65-74.
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indigent litigant in civil contempt proceedings may be imprisoned. 241
To secure this protection, due process requires the appointment of
counsel whenever a civil contemner is deprived of his physical lib
erty. Therefore, since an individual may not be incarcerated unless
he is represented by counsel, a court should be prepared to appoint
counsel for indigent litigants in civil contempt cases whenever there
exists a reasonable probability or significant likelihood that the de
fendant, if he loses, will be denied his personal freedom.

241. See Comment, supra note 140, at 341-53; Mnookin, Review: Using Jail for
Child Support Enforcement, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 338, 366-67 n.136 (1981).

